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FALLACIES ASSOCIATED WITH "BOTTOM-
UP" MANAGEMENT: LESSONS LEARNED 
FROM A TIER 5 NEP-Management of the re-
source base in modern America is undergoing 
two parallel and potentially conflicting para-
digm shifts from traditional precedent. On one 
hand there have been a cry and demand for 
public participation and particularly "stake-
holders" as in the concept of "comanage-
ment." The pressure has evolved because con-
flicting uses for ever more limited resources 
have become more prevalent. The coastal zone 
is a particularly sensitive area since the land 
under and resources within coastal zone waters 
have largely been found to belong within the 
public trust (Slade et aL, 1997). In earlier and 
richer times there had been a simple process 
of allocation practiced by the government be-
cause there were relatively abundant resources. 
It didn't take an enormous amount of infor-
mation or "intelligence" to reach decisions 
and people were largely compensated ade-
quately for the effort that they were willing and 
able to make. 
On the other hand, population growth and 
demographic changes, particularly in the 
coastal zone, have been coupled with an eco-
nomic approach driven by the requirement for 
an ever-growing Gross National Product. The 
fact that negative impact thresholds have al-
ready been crossed in some coastal areas is un-
questioned (Kildow, 1997), and the subsequent 
complexity of blending science, technology, so-
ciology, economy, and politics is currently un-
paralleled in our nation. Hardin (1968) first 
elucidated the problems associated with allo-
cation of commonly owned resources. Crance 
and Draper (1996) have summarized the inter-
action of social dilemma theory with resource 
management issues. The dilemma takes the 
form of conflicting interests between individ-
ual and collective well-being. They contrast 
structural solutions, involving some form of co-
ercion or restriction, with behavioral solutions, 
involving human behavior modification-both 
having the effect of reducing the social dilem-
ma created by resource demand/ conflict. 
Structural solutions are clearly equated with 
what is referred to as "top-down" manage-
ment, which has worked successfully for many 
decades and must certainly remain part of 
management strategies for the foreseeable fu-
ture. But expanded regulation is increasingly 
unpopular, perhaps properly so. 
Stakeholder involvement is the current con-
ventional wisdom (and cliche) for bringing to-
gether diverse interests. It is viewed as a collab-
orative process, requiring identification and 
engagement of groups previously excluded for 
a variety of reasons and the participation of 
traditional antagonists. To some extent, this 
process was initiated and institutionalized by 
the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) 
passed in 1972, and the agencies have em-
braced the application of the legislation to 
varying degrees (Gray and Kusel, 1998). This 
has become an extraordinarily complex pro-
cess because participation in the advisory com-
mittees is perceived as providing significant 
control over decisions to be made, as opposed 
to the provision of advice to decision makers. 
This active inclusion of user communities 
has enormous significance because it now ap-
pears that the sociological obstacles may equal 
or exceed the technical environmental diffi-
culties in enormity. Economic ecology, ecophi-
losophy, environmental ethics, law and politics, 
and even morality are the forums of the future 
for environmental scientists, and the intellec-
tual challenges are immense. It seems likely 
that changing our ideas and policies dealing 
with environmental management may take 
more effort and time than that normally seen 
in the environment itself-cynics might say, 
even in geological time! A most elegant discus-
sion of the technical issues is provided by Fair-
weather (1993) in a consideration of erecting 
the precautionary p1inciple as a policy directive 
for the Australian coastal zone. 
The precautionary principle is almost totally 
absent from American policy, although it may 
emerge if the policy trend of all-inclusive stak-
eholder involvement continues for reasons 
presented below. This evolving legal principle 
has developed within the European commu-
nity, particularly Germany, where most tangible 
resources have become, to some degree, lim-
ited. More important, this situation became 
widely recognized decades ago and sociopoli-
tical "evolution" has occurred as demonstrat-
ed by the Green Party. The principle, as ap-
plied, attempts to reverse the burden of proof 
with regard to environmental impact. Instead 
of assuming that the natural system has ade-
quate assimilative capacity with regard to some 
demand (e.g., habitat loss or pollutant detoxi-
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fication), the principle demands that the user 
prove that it has that ability. Under the Amer-
ican permitting system, which has been dealing 
with a largesse of capacity for almost 200 years, 
the burden of proof lies with those concerned 
about the environment. This means that the 
permit will be granted unless harm can be le-
gally demonstrated. The Precautionary Princi-
ple would demand that environmental safety 
be proven before the action would be allowed. 
While this may sound appealing, there are 
serious concerns with the application of the 
principle as summarized by Gray (1990). The 
point is simple because the variability inherent 
to the environment may confound proving just 
about anything. The uncertainty that is actively 
incorporated into the scientific method fur-
ther undermines the public's confidence in 
the technocracy that supports the decision 
making and allocation process. 
That lack of confidence is one of the most 
serious problems that we have to deal with at 
this time. The general public most frequently 
does not trust the bureaucracy, particularly 
when environmental decisions are made. The 
permitting agencies are perceived by much of 
the public as exactly that-created to grant 
permits! And frankly, the policies based on as-
similative capacity and presumption of "no 
harm until demonstrated" support that con-
tention more often than not! The problem is 
exacerbated by yet another interesting social 
theory which has also emerged in Germany. 
Ulrich Beck (1992) has advanced a theory 
dealing most directly with hazardous technol-
ogy, which is referred to as the risk society thesis. 
In this country the hazards are represented 
most clearly by toxic chemical manufacture 
and release. These are products of a relatively 
modern and "developed" nation in which the 
standard of living is relatively high on a global 
scale. The societies of these robust economies 
have progressed beyond the status of being 
principally engrossed with obtaining enough 
food to survive. When you are hungry enough, 
you take certain risks, physically or economi-
cally, in an effort to assuage that primal need. 
Once achieved, however, the risk society 
shifts to the next highest motivational level of 
survival, which is fear of external harm. Per-
sonal concerns may be manifested by concern 
about crime, political extremism, racial bias, 
climate change, or meteor showers. The pop-
ular press and electronic media are full of 
these messages: real, perceived, and complete-
ly imagined. The technical community has de-
signed an elaborate and arcane system of risk 
assessment which is specifically intended to 
deal with the burgeoning concerns of the pub-
lic but which is clearly understood by almost 
no one. 
Environmental concerns are abundant, as 
in: Is it safe to swim in the water? Can I eat the 
food without getting sick because of either as-
similated or deliberately applied toxins? Cohen 
(1997) attempted to reconcile Beck's thesis 
with that of joseph Huber which is referred to 
as ecological modernization. That approach re-
quires a commitment to the concept of sustain-
ability, an adoption to some degree of the pre-
cautionary principle, and a continued commit-
ment to strict environmental regulation. This 
relatively optimistic viewpoint most closely re-
sembles the thesis rejected by Hardin (1968) 
because it advances the belief that advanced 
technology can solve the problems that it cre-
ates. Even without that qualification, it should 
be noted that, although sustainable develop-
ment is attracting some interest in this country, 
the precautionary principle and "top-down" 
management are not! The cautious approach 
is not going to be invoked until we achieve the 
same level of enlightened "fear" as the Euro-
pean community and the regulatory approach 
is increasingly unpopular in our political cli-
mate. 
Interestingly enough, the community 
around Mobile Bay has begun to evidence 
symptoms of a society that Cohen (1997) clear-
ly describes as being in a transition state. The 
potential is there to become either a risk so-
ciety, motivated by fear, or an ecologically mod-
ern society guided by reason and planning. Lo-
cal concerns about inadequate Best Manage-
ment Practices on construction sites and zon-
ing debates reflect a growing local awareness 
that could go in either direction. 
NATIONAL ESTUARY PROGRAl\1 
The management model that typifies the 
modern approach to coastal issues is a conse-
quence of the passage of the Water Quality Act 
of 1987-the National Estuary Program. The 
structures emerged from years of experimen-
tation and investment of public money in the 
problems of Chesapeake Bay. The model con-
sists of a Management Conference composed 
of a high-level Policy Committee, guided by 
Citizens' and Technical Advisory Committees, 
complemented by an implementing group re-
ferred to as the Management Committee (EPA, 
1989). Ideally, the role of the two advisory 
groups provides that emerging public partici-
pation imperative in the form of advice, out-
reach, and consensus building. The approach 
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has been largely successful given the eminent 
logic of comprehensive planning, the emer-
gence of adaptive management (Colt, 1994; 
Hennessey, 1994; McLain and Lee, 1996), and 
the infusion of about $5 million over more 
than 5 yr for each program. 
The terminology may reflect one of the first 
inherent flaws of the protocol, however, be-
cause there may be an early polarization sep-
arating the "citizens" from the "technicians." 
This reinforces the lack of confidence in tech-
nology felt by the public (as described above) 
because of the technical community's partially 
failing coastal policy of assimilative capacity. 
The EPA has openly acknowledged that the 
policy of national standards and permitting is 
flawed, saying that many environmental de-
clines "would not be reversed even with per-
fect compliance with all environmental laws 
and regulations" (EPA, 1997:1) The structural 
separation of the two sectors is also interesting 
in that it implies that not only are citizens not 
scientists but also that the technicians are 
somehow not citizens. Both attitudes place the 
development interests, which are obviously 
committed to the existing approach to permit-
ting, on the defensive, thus worsening the po-
larization. 
GULF OF MEXICO PROGRAM 
The most explicit movement away from the 
Chesapeake/NEP model emerged during are-
organization of one of the EPA's own efforts 
(Gulf of Mexico Program, 1997). New leader-
ship examined the existing structure and 
moved to eliminate the distinction between the 
two advisory committees. While retaining the 
Policy and Management Committees, "citi-
zens" and technicians were united within "Fo-
cus Teams," which concentrate on selected is-
sues. The approach organized the scheme 
around strategic, tactical, and operational con-
cepts. 
The approach clearly attacks the flaws and 
artificial separation of the original construct, 
enhancing communication between the two 
"classes." The technical community is placed 
in a position of hearing and debating the con-
cerns, perceived or real, of the general public. 
The citizen is afforded the opportunity to both 
question the assumptions of the scientist and 
better understand the technical foundation of 
that professional position. The potential for 
this approach to work was evidenced during 
local meetings in the Mobile Bay region in late 
1994. Issue-oriented public meetings orches-
trated by the South Alabama Regional Plan-
ning Commission successfully combined "citi-
zen" interests with the technical community. A 
structure virtually identical to that espoused by 
the NEP approach had been constructed with 
a view toward building a comprehensive man-
agement plan for the Bay. 
MOBILE BAY NEP CAsE STUDY 
On 27 Dec. 1994, the Federal Register con-
tained the EPA call for nominations to the Na-
tional Estuary Program. These were referred 
to as Tier 5 NEPs. The call contained the ex-
plicit requirement that "EPA will give prefer-
ence to nominations that describe actions un-
derway ... " (EPA, 1994, 59:31816). The Mo-
bile Bay community responded with a success-
ful nomination and Mobile Bay was so 
designated in late summer 1995. 
Unfortunately, this timing coincided with 
the collapse of the federal funding process and 
there was no real progress until 1996. At that 
time Region 4 representatives met with the 
nominators and described the process to be 
followed as described in the estuary primer 
(EPA, 1989). This approach seemed to be ig-
norant of the implications of the Tier 5 defi-
nition established in the Federal Register. The 
subsequent re-creation of the already existing 
structures, as required in the call for nomina-
tions, created profound problems for those 
who had been participating for over a year. 
Many expressed significant frustration and 
abandoned the process altogether, writing the 
effort off to bureaucracy run amok. 
The next debilitating factor to emerge was 
an overwhelming commitment to a complete 
"stakeholderdom" throughout the manage-
ment structure. Policy was to be developed by 
every involved interest, management was to be 
provided by all concerned, and last, but not 
least, advice and community consensus was to 
be garnered from the stereotypical Citizens 
and Technical Advisory Committees. Given the 
alienation and subsequent flight of the bulk of 
these last two groups, the Mobile Bay NEP took 
on the look of an upside-down pyramid since 
the Policy Committee and Management Com-
mittee were each 32 members strong, in direct 
contrast to most of the earlier NEPs! The or-
ganizational lines have been further blurred 
within the Mobile Bay NEP because each mem-
ber of the Policy Committee initially appointed 
a "representative" to the Management Com-
mittee, effectively creating a surrogate policy 
committee. Later, specific stakeholder groups 
were identified for each named member and 
a few were added where deemed appropriate 
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or when someone felt they had been left out 
of the process. 
Part of the problem lies in the laudable, but 
possibly misguided, commitment to achieving 
consensus among stakeholders at every level. 
The original concept provided the opportunity 
for examination of issues at the lowest, most 
inclusive levels, with programs recommended 
to the policy group for implementation by the 
management entity. The redundancy of con-
sensus review has led to rancorous debate and 
continued frustration within the community. 
Progress has been achieved through a partial 
movement toward efficiency. The Mobile Bay 
NEP has developed issue-oriented task forces 
identical with the focus teams of the Gulf of 
Mexico program. This has had all the benefits 
attendant to that approach and brought the 
program much closer to a true "bottom-up" 
format. The Citizens and Technical Advisory 
Committee members have come to the table 
together to develop action plans which will be-
come the management plan itself. 
Unfortunately, the Policy and Management 
Committees have not yet found a way to 
streamline their activities. A persistent "top-
down" philosophy continues to pervade the 
upper echelon of the Management Confer-
ence, confounding the entire process and 
jeopardizing the eventual successful imple-
mentation of the Comprehensive Conservation 
Management Plan. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The true engagement of the public in deci-
sions regarding resources of common value 
seems to be an inarguable position of great 
weight, a "no-brainer" in the vernacular of the 
day. But the rather mindless approach pursued 
by the EPA in constructing the Tier 5 Mobile 
Bay NEP flies in the face of sincere "bottom-
up" management. The construct has been and 
remains a clumsy paean to democracy in its 
purest form overwhelmed by a continued in-
sistence on thoughtless adherence to what has 
been. 
The role of advisory committees must be 
clearly defined by the policy statements and 
then honestly respected and used in decision 
making and implementation. Repeated revisit-
ing of issues and solutions by an unending se-
quence of stakeholders is counterproductive at 
best and debilitating or destructive at worst. 
The Policy component must be established 
from the outset as the source of policy and not 
routine management. This group must be pre-
pared to interact at the strategic level and leave 
development of consensus to the broadest 
spectrum of stakeholding participants. This 
level must include all users, consumers, protec-
tors, people who really don't much care at all, 
and even scientists. The exchange of informa-
tion, technical and emotional, can only assist 
the process. Implementation by the manage-
ment entities will succeed only if the affected 
groups have confidence in the planners and 
eventual success of the planning effort overall. 
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